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Abstract
We survey the literature on prediction mechanisms, including
prediction markets and peer prediction systems. We pay
particular attention to the design process, highlighting the
objectives and properties that are important in the design of
good prediction mechanisms.
Introduction
Mechanism design has been described as “inverse game
theory”. Whereas game theorists ask what outcome results
from a game, mechanism designers ask what game produces
a desired outcome. In this sense, game theorists act like
scientists and mechanism designers like engineers.
In this paper, we survey a number of mechanisms created
to elicit predictions, many newly proposed within the last
decade. We focus on the engineering questions: how do they
work and why? What factors and goals are most important
in their design?
The primary goal of a prediction mechanism is to obtain
and aggregate dispersed information, which often exists in
tacit forms as beliefs, opinions, or judgements of agents.
Coalescing information is a necessary ﬁrst step for decision
making in almost all domains. For example, consider
seasonal inﬂuenza, a signiﬁcant cause of illness and death
around the world. Although it recurs every year, the
geographic location, timing, magnitude, and duration of
outbreaks vary widely. Many people possess relevant pieces
of the full information puzzle, including doctors who meet
patients, clinical microbiologists who perform respiratory
culture tests, pharmacists who ﬁll prescriptions, people who
have the ﬂu, and people who know people who have the
ﬂu. Aggregating such information quickly and accurately
is crucial for inﬂuenza surveillance since timing is very
important for both prevention and treatment of inﬂuenza.
Prediction markets
A prediction market is one type—probably the most
common and well known type—of prediction mechanism.
A prediction market offers contracts whose future payoff
is tied to outcomes of an event of particular interest and
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attracts participants to trade the contract. For instance, a
contract that pays $1 if avian ﬂu is conﬁrmed in US before
March 31, 2011 and $0 otherwise can be used to predict
the likelihood of an avian ﬂu outbreak. Wagering on the
event outcome through buying or selling the contract in the
market, agents can express their opinions in a credible way.
A risk-neutral agent who believes that the probability for
avian ﬂu to be conﬁrmed by the deadline is  can make
proﬁts on expectation by buying the contract if the current
market price is lower than , and selling the contract if
the current market price is higher than . The market
price hence incorporates the information of participants and
approximately represents a real-time consensus forecast for
the event. For example, the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM)
offer contracts on political elections and Intrade supports
trading on a range of events including avian ﬂu, global
average temperature, and Osama bin Laden’s capture.
The use of prediction markets for information aggregation
was inspired by the informational efﬁciency of ﬁnancial
markets (Fama 1970; Hayek 1945). Most of the
prediction markets nowadays use the same continuous
double auction mechanism as stock markets. However,
as prediction markets have shown great potential as
highly effective information aggregation tools in their
early adoptions—market forecasts often outperform other
forecasting methods in a diverse array of settings (Forsythe
et al. 1991; Berg et al. 2001; Chen and Plott 2002; Chen,
Fine, and Huberman 2003; Cowgill, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz
2008; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004; Pennock et al. 2002;
Chen et al. 2005)—recent research is not constrained by the
framework of ﬁnancial markets and has been focusing on
understanding and achieving properties that are important
for the purpose of information aggregation.
Peer prediction systems
Prediction markets elicit forecasts for events with a clear,
objective outcome that can be reliably discerned after the
fact: for example the winner of an election as reported
in the New York Times or the prevalence of ﬂu according
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Many
information aggregation tasks do not conform to this
requirement, either because the outcome is subjective—the
quality of a movie—or unmeasurable—the extinction of the
human race. Peer prediction systems operate by evaluatingeach agent’s prediction not against an objective reality but
against the other agents’ predictions. Remarkably, under
certain conditions such systems can induce truth telling in
equilibrium, meaning that if others are playing honestly the
best response is to play honestly as well, yielding aggregate
assessments of subjective or unmeasurable outcomes.
Design objectives
The goal of a prediction mechanism is to acquire and
aggregate information. Social efﬁciency, or making
participants happier to the greatest extent possible, is not
necessarily an objective at all. On this point, prediction
mechanisms differ from almost every other mechanism
we can think of, including auction, voting, and matching
mechanisms. In a prediction mechanism, trade is a means
to an end, not an end in itself. Thus prediction mechanisms
must be compared against non-market approaches like
polling, forecasting, modeling, machine learning, and belief
aggregation designed to achieve the same ends (Goel et al.
2010).
Prediction mechanisms are unusual in other ways.
A pure prediction mechanism may reasonably operate
at a loss; maximizing revenue or even balancing the
budget may not be a concern. If the operator wants
information, she may be perfectly happy to pay for
it. On the other hand, two somewhat nonstandard
properties are important: expressiveness and liquidity.
An expressive mechanism offers agents ﬂexibility in how
they communicate information; at the extreme, agents can
provide any information they have in any form they like.
Liquidity ensures that agents can be compensated for their
information at any time, even when few others are around.
Prediction mechanisms share at least three more
common objectives: incentive compatibility, computational
tractability, and individual rationality. Incentive
compatibility means that every agent’s best strategy is
to honestly report all of their information as soon as they
have it, an important property that’s difﬁcult to achieve
in general. Computational tractability means that the
outputs of the mechanism, like allocations and prices, can
be computed in a reasonable amount of time. Individual
rationality simply means that agents are better off for
playing the game than not.
Summarizing, the ultimate objective of a prediction
mechanism is to aggregate information. Other objectives are
in service of the primary. These include:
 Liquidity
 Incentive compatibility
 Expressiveness
 Computational tractability
 Individual rationality
Common design objectives that are often not important for
prediction mechanisms include social efﬁciency, revenue
optimization, and budget balance.
In this paper, we survey recent progresses on
understanding and designing prediction mechanisms
according to these objectives. In particular, many automated
market maker mechanisms have been designed to provide
(effectively inﬁnite) liquidity for prediction markets; much
effort has been put into understanding manipulation in
prediction markets and designing prediction mechanisms
to achieve incentive compatibility; and research on
combinatorial prediction markets has advanced our
understanding of the computational tractability of operating
combinatorial prediction markets when we increase
expressiveness.
Scoring rules
The simplest prediction mechanism is a scoring rule, or
payment to a single expert in return for her information.
The payment amount depends on the expert’s prediction
and the actual outcome in a way that motivates the expert
to be honest (Good 1952; Winkler 1969; Savage 1971;
Gneiting and Raftery 2007). Formally, let v represent a
discrete random variable with m mutually exclusive and
exhaustive outcomes and r = hr1;r2;:::;rmi be a reported
probability estimate for the random variable v. A scoring
rule S = fs1(r), s2(r), ...,sm(r)g assigns a score si(r) to
the agent who reports r if outcome i is realized. A regular
scoring rule implies that si(r) is ﬁnite whenever ri > 0. A
regular scoring rule is (strictly) proper if truthful reporting
(strictly) maximizes the expected score of a risk-neutral
agent. In other words, proper scoring rules are incentive
compatible for risk-neutral agents when eliciting probability
assessment. For example, the logarithmic scoring rule,
si(r) = ai + blog(ri) (1)
where b > 0, is a widely used proper scoring rule. In
fact, every convex and differentiable function of r deﬁnes
a proper scoring rule (McCarthy 1956; Hendrickson and
Buehler 1971; Savage 1971).
To obtain multiple forecasts, the operator could give
separate scoring rule payments to everyone. Or, he could
employ a shared scoring rule that rewards each expert
according to only the difference between her prediction
and the average of the others (Kilgour and Gerchak 2004).
Now experts risk losing money in addition to gaining
it—the system becomes a constant sum game—though the
mechanism is still incentive compatible assuming experts
don’t revise their beliefs. Lambert et al. (Lambert et al.
2008) explore self-ﬁnancing (budget-balanced) wagering
mechanisms of this type in an axiomatic framework. Indeed,
the line between scoring rules and markets becomes blurred:
for example, the most common automated market maker
used for prediction markets can be viewed as a sequential
shared scoring rule, as we shall now see.
Liquidity and market makers
An auctioneer matches up willing traders with each other –
the auctioneer never takes on any risk of his own. This is
how most ﬁnancial exchanges like the stock market operate,
and how IEM, Intrade and gambling exchanges like Betfair
operate.
An automated market maker, on the other hand, will quote
a price for any contract whatsoever. Even a lone agent cantrade with the market maker as long as she accepts the price,
greatly enhancing liquidity. The liquidity comes at a cost
though: the market maker can and often does lose money,
though as we’ll see below the loss can be bounded.
Auctions work well for stock markets where there
are a large number of buyers and sellers and ﬁnding a
counter-party to trade is relatively easy. However, when
there are fewer participants per outcome, auctions may
suffer from illiquidity or the thin market problem,
potentially preventing agents from revealing their
information. An auction is a zero-sum game for traders.
As such, according to the no-trade theorem (Milgrom
and Stokey 1982) paradox, rational risk-neutral traders
will never trade, each reasoning roughly that any willing
trading partner must know something that he doesn’t know.
The market maker’s loss is the traders gain, turning the
mechanism into a positive-sum game that even rational
risk-neutral agents should play.
Market scoring rules (MSR) are a family of automated
market maker mechanisms proposed by Hanson (2003;
2007). An MSR is a sequential shared version of a proper
scoring rule. The market maker starts the market with some
initial probability r0 over the outcomes. Given a proper
scoring rule, every trader in the market may change the
current probability estimate to a new estimate of its choice at
any time as long as it agrees to pay the scoring rule payment
associated with the current probability estimate and receive
the scoring rule payment associated with the new estimate.
If outcome i is realized, a trader that changes the probability
estimatefromrold tornew payssi(rold)andreceivessi(rnew).
The market maker only pays the last trader and receives
payment from the ﬁrst trader. Because there are a large class
of proper scoring rules, MSR is a large family of market
makers.
From the above description, MSR doesn’t seem to closely
resemble markets, as no contracts are traded and participants
sequentially report probabilities. However, under mild
conditions, any MSR is proven to be equivalent to a cost
function based market maker that offers contracts to trade
and is more natural for implementation purposes (Chen and
Pennock 2007).
To predict the outcome of random variable v, a cost
function based market maker offers m Arrow-Debreu
contracts, each for one outcome. An Arrow-Debreu contract
pays $1 if the corresponding outcome is realized and $0
otherwise. Let qi be the total quantity of contract i held by
all traders combined, and let q be the vector of all quantities
held. The market maker utilizes a cost function C(q) that
records the total amount of money traders have spent as a
function of the total number of shares held of each contract.
A trader who wants to buy any bundle of contracts such
that the total number of outstanding shares changes from
qold to qnew must pay C(qnew)   C(qold) dollars to the
market maker. Negative quantities encode sell orders and
negative “payments” encode sale proceeds earned by the
trader. At any time, the instantaneous price of contract
i is pi(q) = @C(q)=@qi, representing the cost per share
for purchasing/selling an inﬁnitesimal quantity of contract
i. Any C(q) that is (i) differentiable, (ii) monotonically
increasing, i.e. if q  q0, C(q)  C(q0), and (iii) positive
translation invariant, which is deﬁned as C(q + k1) =
C(q)+k for any q and k, deﬁnes a valid cost function based
market maker such that pi(q) is nonnegative and
m X
i=1
pi(q) = 1
for all q (Chen and Vaughan 2010).
An MSR can be equivalently implemented as a cost
function based market maker if an agent who changes the
market prices from p to p0 by trading in a cost function
based market gets the same proﬁt (under every outcome)
as if it changes the market probability from p to p0 in the
MSR.Foralogarithmicmarketscoringrule(LMSR)market
maker that uses the logarithmic scoring rule (1) (Hanson
2003; Chen and Pennock 2007), the cost and price functions
are
C(q) = blog
m X
j=1
eqj=b; and pi(q) =
eqi=b
Pm
j=1 eqj=b:
Morerecently, ChenandVaughan(2010)haveestablished
a one-to-one mapping between the class of strictly proper
MSR and the class of convex cost function based market
makers. An MSR with strictly proper scoring rule fsi(r)g
and a cost function based market maker with convex C(q)
map to each other if and only if
C(q) = sup
p2m
 
m X
i=1
piqi  
m X
i=1
pisi(p)
!
(2)
where m is the probability simplex. Given a strictly proper
MSR, (2) gives the cost function for the corresponding
cost function based market maker in terms of a convex
optimization problem. The optimal p to the optimization
problem gives the market prices p(q). Chen and
Vaughan(2010)alsoprovidetheexpressionoffsi(r)ggiven
any convex C(q). The pair of markets are equivalent in
terms of trader proﬁts when prices for all outcomes are
positive. This mapping allows the easy conversion between
MSR and cost function based market makers.
The cost function based market makers and hence the
MSRhaveaninterestingconnectiontono-regretlearning. In
the framework of learning from expert advice, an algorithm
makes a sequence of predictions based on the advice of a set
of experts and receives a corresponding sequence of losses.
At every time step t, every expert i receives a loss li;t. The
algorithm maintains a weight wi;t for each expert i at time t,
where X
i
wi;t = 1:
The loss received by the algorithm at time step t is the
weighted sum of the expert losses. The goal of the algorithm
is to adjust weights of experts to achieve a cumulative
loss that is “almost as low” as the cumulative loss of the
best performing expert, even if expert losses are chosen
by an adversary. Chen and Vaughan (2010) show that any
cost function based market maker can be interpreted asan algorithm for the learning from expert advice problem
by treating outcomes as experts and equating trades made
in the market with expert losses observed by the learning
algorithm. Moreover, there is a one-to-one mapping
between the class of convex cost function based market
makers and the class of Follow the Regularized Leader
algorithms for the learning from expert advice problem.
Two other families of market maker mechanisms have
been proposed based on different rationales but have some
equivalence relationships with MSR and cost function based
market makers. Chen and Pennock (2007) introduced
utility-based market makers. A utility-based market
maker has a utility function of money and a subjective
probability distribution of the event. It sets the instantaneous
market prices of Arrow-Debreu contracts as its risk-neutral
probabilities and hence keeps its expected utility constant
at any time of the market. For the class of hyperbolic
absolute riskaversion utility functions, which contains many
frequently used utility functions, and the class of weighted
pseudospherical scoring rules, there is a one-to-one mapping
between the utility-based market makers and MSR. The
sequential convex parimutuel mechanism (SCPM) (Agrawal
et al. 2009) is a market maker designed for limit orders. In
a SCPM, traders specify a maximum quantity of shares that
they would like to buy and a maximum price per share that
theyarewillingtopay. Themarketmakerdecideshowmany
shares of trade to accept by solving a convex optimization
problem. The payment of the accepted trade is determined
by a generalized VCG mechanism. Although SCPM is
deﬁned differently and can more naturally incorporate limit
orders and batch orders, the underlying mathematics of
SCPM are analogous to those of cost function based market
makers.
Another automated market maker mechanism is the
dynamic parimutuel markets (DPM) (Pennock 2004; Chen,
Pennock, and Kasturi 2008). DPM is a dynamic-cost variant
of a parimutuel market, which is often used in horse racing.
There are m contracts offered in a DPM market, each
corresponding to one outcome. As in a parimutuel market,
traderswhowageronthetrueoutcomeinDPMsplitthetotal
pool of money at the end of the market, in proportion to the
amount they wagered. However, unlike a parimutuel market,
the price of a single share in DPM varies dynamically
according to a price function, thus allowing traders to sell
their shares prior to the determination of the outcome for
proﬁts or losses. From a trader’s perspective, DPM acts
as a market maker in a similar way as cost function based
market makers, the major exception being that the payoff of
a contract is not ﬁxed. The commonly used cost and price
functions of DPM are
C(q) =
v u u
t
m X
j=1
q2
j; and pi(q) =
qi qPm
j=1 q2
j
:
The payoff of contract i when outcome i happens is
oi(qf) =
C(qf)
q
f
i
where qf is the quantity vector at the end of the market.
DPM needs the market maker to seed the market with
some initial shares (money), which can be arbitrarily small,
because the price function is not deﬁned at q = 0.
Because automated market makers accept orders without
knowing the realized outcome of the event, they can
potentially lose money. A key property that research
on designing automated market makers has focused on is
bounded loss, which ensures that no matter what happens in
the market and no matter which outcome is realized, the loss
of the market maker is bounded. For an MSR, as the market
makerpaysthelasttraderandgetspaidbytheﬁrsttrader, the
worst-case loss of the market maker happens when traders
change the market probability of the realized outcome to 1.
The worst-case loss of an MSR with scoring rule fsi(r)g
and initial market probability r0 is bounded by
max
i
max
r2m
si(r)   si(r0) = max
i
si(ei)   si(r0)
where ei is the vector with 1 assigned to its i-th element
and 0 everywhere else. Thus, any MSR market maker
with a regular proper scoring rule has bounded loss. Given
uniform initial market probability, the loss of an LMSR
market maker is bounded by blogm, where m is the number
of outcomes (Hanson 2003). For cost function based market
makers, the worst-case loss bound can be characterized as
sup
q2Rm

sup
i
qi   (C(q)   C(0))

:
For DPM, the loss of the market maker is bounded by its
initial subsidy as the market is parimutuel.
LMSR has become the de facto market maker mechanism
for prediction markets. It is used by many companies
including Inkling Markets, Consensus Point, Yahoo! and
Microsoft. However, setting the value of b, often called the
liquidity parameter, in LMSR is more art than science in
practice. The b parameter determines how quickly prices
move with trades as well as the market maker’s worst-case
loss. If b is too small, the price of a contract changes
dramatically after a small number of shares is traded. If b
is too large, the price of a contract barely moves even with
a large volume of trades. Othman et. al. (2010) propose
a modiﬁed LMSR where the liquidity parameter no longer
needs to be set ﬁxed a priori. In this modiﬁed LMSR, the
value of b increases continuously with the total number of
shares of all contracts purchased by all traders. Unlike the
original LMSR where the prices of all contracts always sum
to 1, the modiﬁed LMSR allows the sum of the prices to be
greater than 1. Intuitively, the modiﬁed LMSR behaves as if
it charges some transaction fees for every inﬁnitesimal trade
and uses the collected transaction fee to increase the value
of the liquidity parameter.
Incentive compatibility
For prediction markets, incentive compatibility means
that a risk-neural agent maximizes its expected proﬁt
by changing the market probability to its probability
assessment immediately. In other words, the agent will
reveal its information truthfully and immediately. Incentivecompatibility provides simpliﬁcation for mechanisms,
because agents do not need to strategize and simply
revealing their information is the best response. Moreover, if
agents lie about their information, information aggregation
may be put into question.
Prediction markets are not incentive compatible in
general. The no-trade theorem means that rational traders
should not trade at all in CDA. The Kyle’s model of ﬁnancial
markets posits two types of traders: rational traders and
noisy traders (Kyle 1985). The existence of noisy traders
makes CDA a positive-sum game for the rational traders
and hence circumvents the no-trade theorem. However, the
mechanism is still not incentive compatible. For example,
monopolist information holders will not fully reveal their
information right away: instead, they will leak their
information into the market gradually over time to obtain
a greater proﬁt (Chakraborty and Yilmaz 2004). Market
scoring rules and most cost function based market makers
are myopically incentive compatible – a risk-neutral agent
will report its probability truthfully if it only participates
once.1 But because an agent can potentially inﬂuence
other agents by its trading action and can trade more than
once, a forward-looking agent may lie about its information
to mislead other agents (“bluff”) with the hope to obtain
greater proﬁt by correcting their mistakes later.
While incentive compatibility in mechanism design often
means dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, incentive
compatibility for prediction mechanisms typically refers
to Bayesian-Nash incentive compatibility. In fact, all
existing prediction mechanisms that involve direct or
indirect interactions of agents are not dominant-strategy
incentive compatible.2 Researchers hence focus on
understanding and designing prediction mechanisms to
implement Bayesian-Nash incentive compatibility. Some
consider an even weaker notion of truthfulness – whether
the mechanism converges to full information aggregation
or obtains a representative sample of agent opinions at an
equilibrium even if individual agents may not play honestly.
Chen et. al. (2009) attempt to understand whether there
exists game-theoretic equilibrium at which agents truthfully
reveal their information as soon as they can in prediction
markets. They consider a two-outcome LMSR market and
model it as a n-player, incomplete-information, dynamic
game. At the beginning of the market, each risk-neutral
player i gets a private signal si that is stochastically
related to the outcome of the event !. The joint
distribution of si’s and ! is common knowledge. Players
trade in the LMSR market according to a pre-speciﬁed
sequence. The equilibrium behavior of the game depends
on the information structure of the players. When players
have conditionally independent signals (i.e., conditional
on !, si’s are independent), the unique Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) of the game is the truthful betting
equilibrium where every player truthfully reveals its
information in the ﬁrst round it can trade. Information is
fully aggregated after everyone has traded. However, when
the signals are unconditionally independent, a complete
characterization of the equilibrium is unknown, but it is
known that truthfully revealing one’s information is not an
equilibrium strategy. In fact, it is shown that there does
not exist an equilibrium where all information is aggregated
within ﬁnite number of trades. A discounted LMSR where
the b parameter in the logarithmic scoring rule decreases
over time is then proposed to ensure that information is fully
aggregated in the limit with unconditionally independent
signals. Jain and Sami (2010) conduct lab experiments
to test the above theoretical results. They ﬁnd that the
assumption of pre-speciﬁed trading sequence is crucial for
the different behavior under the two information structures.
Information is better aggregated in the experiments when
the trading sequence is pre-speciﬁed, compared with when
traders endogenously decide when to trade. Moreover, when
trading sequence is pre-speciﬁed, Jain and Sami ﬁnd that
there are more manipulative behaviors with unconditionally
independent signals than with conditionally independent
signals, while the difference is not observed without
pre-speciﬁed trading sequence.
Ostrovsky (2009) characterizes the condition of a contract
and an informationstructure under which prediction markets
converge to full information aggregation at PBEs, even if
traders may not truthfully reveal their information at their
ﬁrst round of trade. He considers both Kyle’s noisy-trader
model of CDA and MSR market makers. He analyzes
a dynamic game of n risk-neutral agents each receiving
a piece of private information. He shows that if the
contract together with the information structure satisﬁes a
separability condition, information gets aggregated in the
limit at any PBE; if the separability condition is not satisﬁed,
there exists some prior distribution of event outcomes such
that at some PBE information is not aggregated. Iyer,
Johari, and Moallemi (2010) extend Ostrovsky’s work
by considering risk-averse agents. They study a setting
where n risk-averse agents with conditionally independent
private signals participate in an automated market maker
mechanism. With risk averse agents, Iyer, Johari, and
Moallemi identify a smoothness condition of the prices
that together with some other reasonable conditions of the
marketcanensurefullinformationaggregationinthelimitat
any PBE. Loosely speaking, smoothness requires that there
is no bid-ask spread for purchasing/selling an inﬁnitesimal
quantity of any contract. For cost function based market
makers, this is always satisﬁed due to differentiability of
the cost function. In fact, Iyer, Johari, and Moallemi
prove that for any cost function based market maker
that has bounded loss, if the signal space of agents is
ﬁnite, information is always aggregated in the limit with
risk-averse agents at any pure-strategy PBE. In addition, if
there is at least one risk-neutral agent in the market, the
market price eventually reﬂects the posterior probability of
the event conditional on the pooled information. It’s worth
mentioning that although both Ostrovsky (2009) and Iyer,
Johari, and Moallemi (2010) characterize conditions for
full information aggregation at PBEs, the existence of such
PBEs is still an open question.
Manipulation
The work surveyed in this section so far all implicitly
assume that agents could not take actions to inﬂuence theoutcome of the event. This is often not true in the real
world. For example, with an internal prediction market to
predict a software delivery date, a developer of the software
who purchases contracts in the market may deliberately
take actions outside of the market to affect the software
delivery date so that the contracts he purchased will pay
off. Shi, Conitzer, and Guo (2009) attempt to avoid such
incentive misalignment. They consider a setting where
there is a principal (e.g. the company) who sets up a
prediction mechanism to collect information about an event
of interest. A group of agents who have information about
the event of interest can also take actions to affect its
outcome. The principal has a preference over the event
outcomes (e.g. on-time delivery of the software is preferred)
and hence requires the prediction mechanism to not only
elicit information from agents but also not incentivize
the agents to take actions that may harm the principal.
Shi, Conitzer, and Guo consider one-round MSR markets
where every agent can only participate once. Focusing
on the one-round mechanisms removes the complication
of strategic play within the market because agents should
play truthfully when they only participate once. Given
the utility vector of the principal for event outcomes, they
characterize “principal-aligned” proper scoring rules that do
not incentivize agent to take any action that may harm the
principal in expectation. When using a “principal-aligned”
proper scoring rule for a one-round MSR with n agents, the
principal in the worst case needs to pay n times as much
as he would pay if incentive alignment is not required. The
intuition is that the principal needs to subsidize each agent
in a way such that the beneﬁt that the agent can get when
the desired outcome happens is higher than the possible
beneﬁt it can get within the market by manipulating the
event outcome.
Ultimately, information elicitation and aggregation are
conducted to assist decision making. If decisions will be
made based on the information conveyed by a prediction
market, agentsmayhaveincentivestomanipulatethemarket
in order to achieve the desired decision outcome. Dimitrov
and Sami (2010) consider manipulations of prediction
markets due to a certain type of conﬂicting incentives.
Unlike previous work where strategic agents only care about
proﬁts within a single market, Dimitrov and Sami model a
situation where an agent’s trade in one market can inﬂuence
the trading decision of another agent in a second market.
Speciﬁcally, they consider a simple two-player three-stage
model, where Alice trades in the ﬁrst market, Bob observing
Alice’s action in the ﬁrst market makes his trading decision
in the second market, and Alice can then trade in the second
market. Alice can potentially manipulate the price in the
ﬁrst market so that Bob’s trading decision in the second
market leaves the market in a more proﬁtable state for Alice.
Dimitrov and Sami characterize the weak perfect Bayesian
equilibria of the game and ﬁnd that the payoffs of Alice and
Bob are unique across all equilibria.
Peer prediction
Prediction markets rely on a veriﬁable “ground truth” of the
event of interest to evaluate reports of agents. However,
many events in the real world are either subjective or
non-veriﬁable. In the past six years, a stream of work
develops scoring rule based methods that evaluate the report
of an agent against the reports of its peers to truthfully elicit
information for events where ground truth does not exist or
can not be obtained.
Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (2005) propose the
ﬁrst peer prediction method. Suppose ! is the event of
interest, which is represented as a discrete random variable.
Each agent receives a signal si that is independent, and
randomly drawn from a probability distribution conditional
on the true state of !. Both the prior distribution of
! and the conditional probability distribution of signals
sij! are common knowledge. The true state of ! is not
veriﬁable. The peer prediction method makes use of the
stochastic correlation between signals of agents to achieve
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) where every agent
truthfully reports its signals to the mechanism. If an agent i
truthfully reports its signal si, knowing the prior distribution
the mechanism calculates agent i’s posterior probability
of the signal of a reference agent j, P(sjjsi), which can
then be evaluated and rewarded using a proper scoring rule
according to agent j’s reported signal. Thus, if all other
agents report truthfully, agent i maximizes its expected
reward by reporting truthfully. However, truthful reporting
is not a unique equilibrium. There exist lying equilibria.
Jurca and Faltings (2006) improve the peer prediction
method by ﬁnding the incentive payment computationally
to reduce the total payment of the mechanism. They further
show that the peer prediction method can be extended to
make incentive payment based on more than one reference
report, to deal with collusion and sybil attack, and to ensure
that truthful reporting is the unique equilibrium (Jurca and
Faltings 2007). Goel, Reeves, and Pennock (2009) propose
a collective revelation mechanism that not only admits a
truthful reporting BNE but also weights the estimates of
agents by their relative information content.
The peer prediction method, its extensions, and
the collective revelation mechanism are based on the
assumption of common knowledge of common prior.
Agents are assumed to have a common prior of the event and
signals, and the mechanism makes use of the common prior
in determining incentive payments. Bayesian Truth Serum
(BTS), introduced by Prelec (2004), has a slightly weaker
assumption. It still assumes that agents have common
prior, but the prior can be unknown and the mechanism
does not explicitly use the prior distribution. Consider an
opinion poll. BTS works by asking each agent to report
its subjective answer to the poll and an estimate of the
ﬁnal distribution over possible answers. The reward of the
agent consists of two parts: an information score for the
answer, which is higher for answers that are surprisingly
more common than collectively predicted, and a prediction
score that is inversely proportional to the Kullback-Leibler
divergence of the estimated answer distribution from the
actual answer distribution of the poll. Truthful reporting of
both the subjective answer and the estimate of the answer
distribution is a BNE for BTS. One limitation of BTS is that
partial poll results can not be revealed before the end of thepoll. To overcome this limitation, Jurca and Faltings (2008)
propose a mechanism that encourages a more general notion
of truthful reporting for online polls where each agent knows
the partial poll result before its participation. At a BNE of
this mechanism, the reports of agents are not necessarily
truthful, but they always reduce the gap between the updated
partial poll result and the subjective belief of the reporter
regarding the poll outcome. The poll result hence converges
to the correct outcome, that is the true fractions of agents
who endorse different poll answers.
Lambert and Shoham (2008) take a different approach.
Instead of seeking truthful reports of agents, they propose
a mechanism that can extract a representative sample of
opinions. The mechanism selects a group of agents and
the payment to each agent depends only on the reports
of the selected agents. Unlike the previous methods, the
mechanism does not need the existence of a common
prior. When at least one participant may be trusted, the
mechanism ensures that at all Nash equilibria true samples
of opinions are obtained. Lambert and Shoham (2009)
further give necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the
existence of incentive payments that induce truthful answers
in online questionnaires at an equilibrium, and provide
characterizations of such payments.
Expressiveness and computational tractability
Prediction mechanisms with more than a few outcomes
become unwieldy if agents must provide information about
each outcome individually, one at a time. An expressive
mechanism allows agents to place combinatorial bids
that say things about sets of outcomes together, greatly
simplifying and reducing the communication needed.
For example, imagine a 539-outcome prediction market
for the US Presidential election with one outcome for every
possible number of electoral votes between 0 and 538 that
theDemocraticcandidatewillreceive. Apredictionlike“the
Democrat will receive between 269 and 312 electoral votes”
becomes tedious and inefﬁcient if each of the intervening
44 outcomes is traded separately. A natural form of
expressiveness here is to allow the entire interval to be
bought in a single transaction.
Combinatorial bids are useful in any market but they
are almost necessary when the outcome space is itself
combinatorial, for example all possible permutations of a
horse race. A race among ten horses has 10! outcomes
and a prediction like “horse A will ﬁnish ahead of horse
B” involves half of them, or over 1.8 million outcomes, too
many to deal with individually.
Combinatorial bids also allow for smarter accounting so
traders’ funds aren’t unnecessarily locked up to cover two
bets that provably can never lose together, for example
“Horse A will not win” and “Horse B will not win”.
Another form of expressiveness allows traders to place
indivisible bids that the mechanism must ﬁll either
completely or not at all. In the context of prediction markets,
this option may not be so important. Traders may be
happy to receive partially ﬁlled bids with both less risk and
proportionally less reward than they requested. If they are
willing to risk $100 to win $200, many would also be willing
to risk $50 to win $100 instead. Still, some traders may
want indivisible bids to guarantee a minimum level of risk
or insurance, otherwise opting out and going elsewhere.
Allowing greater expressiveness comes at a potential
cost in the computational burden on the mechanism. A
prediction market auctioneer can process combinatorial
bids in time polynomial in the number of outcomes using
linear programming if bids can be partially ﬁlled. If
traders can place indivisible bids, the problem becomes
NP-hard (Bossaerts, Fine, and Ledyard 2002; Fortnow et al.
2004). The automated market maker algorithms above also
run in polynomial time in the number of outcomes. Optimal
accounting, or computing the maximum a trader can lose
in the worst case and thus the minimum amount of cash or
credit the center needs to reserve for that trader, is typically
polynomial in the number of outcomes.
So, adding (divisible) combinatorial bids to markets with
hundreds or even thousands of outcomes is feasible, with
almost no downside. Still, combinatorial bidding is not
supported by the vast majority of ﬁelded prediction markets,
including IEM, intrade, Inkling, Newsfutures, and HSX,
and the majority of ﬁnancial and betting markets broadly
speaking. Exceptions include Othman and Sandholm’s
Gates Hillman Prediction Market (Othman and Sandholm
2010), the Policy Analysis Market (PAM), Bossaerts
et al.’s (2002) combined value trading mechanism, the
parimutuel call market mechanism (Agrawal et al. 2009;
Baron and Lange 2005; Lange and Economides 2007;
Peters, So, and Ye 2007), and Yahoo!’s Yoopick (2008) and
Predictalot (2010) systems.
When the outcome space is combinatorial, expressivity
poses a more difﬁcult computational challenge. A running
time that’s polynomial in the number of outcomes is not
good enough, since the number of outcomes is exponential
in the number of base objects. Across a range of
combinatorial-outcome settings, the auctioneer problem is
NP-hard and the LMSR market maker pricing problem is
#P-hard. There are a few special cases where limiting
expressivity enough can render the problem tractable.
Optimal accounting in the combinatorial-outcome setting is
NP-hard.
Here are some of the known results.
 Boolean betting. Base objects are binary events,
for example whether the Democratic candidate wins
Alabama, Alaska, etc., for all ﬁfty states. Outcomes are
all possible combinations, in this case all 250 ways the
election might swing. Predictions are phrased in Boolean
logic, for example “Ohio and Florida but not Virginia”.
(Conditionals like “Nevada if California” can also be
handledwithoutaffectingthecomplexity.) Theauctioneer
problem is NP-hard and remains hard even if the
most complicated bet allowed is conjoining two events.
Allowing indivisible bids makes the problem NP-hard
even for a small number of outcomes polynomial in the
number of base objects (Fortnow et al. 2004). LMSR
pricing is #P-hard and inapproximable in general (Chen
et al. 2008).
 Tournament betting. This is a special case ofBoolean betting where base objects are matches in a
single-elimination tournament, a common structure in
sports playoffs. LMSR pricing remains hard, though if
bets are restricted to ”team A advances to round k” prices
can be computed in polynomial time using a Bayesian
network (Chen, Goel, and Pennock 2008).
 Permutation betting. Outcomes are permutations of base
objects, for example all 10! possible ﬁnish orderings in
a 10 horse race. Predictions are properties of the ﬁnal
ordering, for example Horse B will ﬁnish ahead of horse
D, or Horse B will ﬁnish between 3rd and 7th place.
The auctioneer and LMSR pricing problems are both
intractable and remain so even if all bets are pairwise:
“X will ﬁnish ahead of Y”. Interestingly, the auctioneer
problem becomes tractable if all bets encode one-to-many
subsets of the form “Horse A will ﬁnish in positions
1,3, or 7” or “Horses C or E will ﬁnish in position
2”, although the pricing problem remains hard (Chen et
al. 2007). Ghodsi et al. (2008) show that even subset
betting is hard for indivisible bids, unless bets are further
restricted to candidate-rank speciﬁcations like “Horse B
will ﬁnish in position 3”. Agrawal et al. (2008) give a
polynomial-time convex optimization algorithm for the
auctioneer problem when bets are linear combinations
of candidate-rank speciﬁcations. They also show how
to use maximum entropy to approximate the full joint
distribution over all n! permutations from the n2 marginal
prices for each candidate-rank pair maintained by their
mechanism.
 Taxonomy betting. Base objects are (discretized)
numbers at the base or leaves of a tree. An internal
node in the tree represents the sum of its children. For
example, the numbers might represent page views of a
sports website organized in a hierarchy by topic (football,
basketball, baseball), subtopic (college, professional),
subsubtopic, etc. Outcomes are the cross product of the
numbers at the leaves. Bets can be placed on the range
of any node in the tree, for example “page views of
the NBA subsection will be between 100K and 150K”.
LMSR pricing in this context is tractable using dynamic
programming, though slight generalizations of the betting
language render it hard (Guo and Pennock 2009).
Why do we need or want combinatorial-outcome
markets? Simply put, they allow for the collection of
more information. Combinatorial outcomes allow traders
to assess the correlations among base objects, not just
their independent likelihoods, for example the correlation
between Democrats winning in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Understanding correlations is key in many applications,
including risk assessment.
Although ﬁnancial and betting exchanges, bookmakers,
and racetracks are modernizing, turning their operations
over to the computers and moving online, their core logic for
processing bids hasn’t changed much since auctioneers were
people. For simplicity, they treat all bets like apples and
oranges, processing them independently, even when they are
related. For example, bets on a horse to win and to ﬁnish in
the top two are managed separately at the racetrack, as are
optionsto buy astock atstrike price 30 andstrike price20 on
the CBOE. In both cases it’s a logical truism that the ﬁrst is
worth less than the second, yet the market pleads ignorance,
leaving it to traders to enforce consistent pricing.
In a combinatorial market, a bet on Democrats to win
Ohio and Florida automatically increases the odds on Ohio
alone, as it logically should. Mindless mechanical tasks like
this are handled automatically, by algorithms that are far
better at it anyway, freeing up traders for the primary task
a prediction market asks them to do: provide information.
Traders are free to express their information in whatever
form they ﬁnd most natural, and it all ﬂows into the same
pool of liquidity. Especially in the context of a prediction
market, itmakessensetofocustradersongivinginformation
rather than content-free strategies like arbitrage.
It’s hard to imagine a combinatorial-outcome market
working in practice without an automated market maker:
otherwise, traders are unlikely to ﬁnd each other in the
sea of choices. We don’t believe that markets need to
restrict themselves to polynomial-time bidding languages,
often a severe constraint. Instead, we believe that
computing approximate market maker prices via sampling,
the approach taken by Yahoo!’s Predictalot system (2010),
offers a route to practical general-purpose systems. The
sampling problem in this setting is difﬁcult and unsolved,
and requires care in order to ensure that traders cannot game
the market maker for unbounded proﬁt.
Beyond computational concerns, the market operator
should weigh any potential gains in information against the
fact that traders’ attention and liquidity will be severely
fractured across the nearly limitless things available to bet
on.
Conclusion
We surveyed the literature on prediction markets and peer
prediction systems with a focus on the properties that are
important for information elicitation and aggregation, the
ultimate objective of prediction mechanisms. Prediction
markets are used to elicit and aggregate information about
uncertain events whose outcome can be veriﬁed at a speciﬁc
time in the future. We reviewed recent research on
designingautomatedmarketmakermechanismsthatprovide
liquidity for the market, understanding whether information
is truthfully aggregated in prediction markets with strategic
agents, and developing combinatorial prediction markets
where market participants have more expressiveness to
reveal their information. Peer prediction systems are
designed for eliciting information on events where ground
truth does not exist or is unobtainable. The most important
challenge here is how to elicit truthful reports from strategic
agents. We reviewed peer prediction systems where truth
telling is induced in equilibrium.
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